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Indirect Utility Maximization under Risk: 
A Heterogeneous Panel Application
Abstract
The curvature properties of the indirect utility function imply a set of refutable implications in 
the form of comparative static results and symmetric relations for the competitive firm operating 
under uncertainty. These hypotheses, first derived and empirically tested under output price 
uncertainty by Saha and Shumway (1998), are extended in this article to the more general case of 
both price and quantity uncertainty and result in an important theoretical finding. Using recently 
developed techniques for testing unit root and cointegration in heterogeneous panels, we develop 
a model of U.S. agricultural production based on the time series properties of a panel of 
state-level data and contrast test implications with those resulting from a traditional model that 
presumes stationarity in all variables. Although differing in specific outcomes, the empirical tests 
of the refutable hypotheses render the same conclusions for both models: we fail to reject most 
refutable hypotheses under output price and output quantity risk, symmetry conditions implied 
by a twice-continuously-differentiable indirect utility function are rejected, two restrictive risk 
preference hypotheses are also rejected, and, at individual observations, data are generally 
consistent with most (but not all) of the hypotheses implied by individual states acting as though 
they were expected utility-maximizing firms.       
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Indirect Utility Maximization under Risk:
A Heterogeneous Panel Application
Because of the long time periods between commitment of resources and generation of 
marketable output in production agriculture, a high level of uncertainty is associated with many 
production decisions. Because producers frequently have few options available to significantly 
alter input combinations after the decision is made to produce a commodity, opportunities to 
reduce the adverse consequences of risk are often limited in the short run. Consequently, 
economists concerned about decision making in production agriculture have had a long history 
of considering the impact of risk and uncertainty. 
Building on the early work of Sandmo (1971) and Batra and Ullah (1974), who 
developed the theory of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty, agricultural 
economists have examined firm operations and developed testable firm models under various 
sources of risk. The pioneering work of Pope (1980) derived testable hypotheses expressed in 
symmetry and homogeneity results under constant absolute risk aversion and price uncertainty. 
His symmetry results proved simple enough for empirical application under certain classes of 
utility functions (Antonovitz and Roe 1986). Chavas and Pope (1985) extended Pope’s work by 
examining price uncertainty within a general risk preference framework which facilitated 
empirical tests of firm behavior under the expected utility hypothesis. Paris (1988) analyzed the 
competitive entrepreneur under output and input price uncertainty in a long-run scenario. Dalal
(1990) derived additional symmetry conditions for empirical application under price risk. 
Adrangi and Raffiee (1999) derived testable implications within a comparative statics framework 
for the competitive firm operating under output and input price uncertainty.3
A number of studies have also provided empirical tests for behavioral hypotheses of the 
firm operating under risk. For example, Chavas and Holt (1990) developed an acreage supply 
response model consistent with expected utility maximization and empirically tested the 
symmetry restrictions using annual time-series data for U.S. corn and soybean acreage decisions. 
They found empirical evidence for the symmetry conditions and decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA) on the part of the producer. Later they (Chavas and Holt 1996) tested the 
economic implications of producer behavior under price and production risk in U.S. corn and 
soybean acreage response decisions. The null hypothesis of CARA was rejected and evidence 
was again found to support DARA. Theoretical and functional form deficiencies in the 
Chavas-Holt analysis were addressed by Satyanarayan (1999), who extended previous works to
the firm operating under domestic price and exchange rate uncertainty.
Park and Antonovitz (1992a, b) derived and empirically tested the reciprocity conditions 
linking optimal output and hedging decisions for the competitive firm that uses hedging to 
manage price uncertainty. They concluded that the symmetric results as well as constant absolute 
risk aversion (CARA) for their California feedlot could not be rejected. Dalal (1994) alleged a 
misspecification, criticized their conclusions, and developed a more general formulation using 
the envelope theorem and derivatives of the indirect expected utility function. 
Saha and Shumway (1998) derived general refutable implications from the first-order and 
second-order curvature properties of the indirect utility function under output price uncertainty 
and empirically tested each postulate for a sample of Kansas wheat producers. They failed to 
reject any of the implications of expected utility maximization for their data set but rejected 
restrictive risk attitudes including both CARA and risk neutrality.4
Several studies have recently investigated firm behavior under risk using pooled 
cross-sectional time-series data (e.g., Saha and Shumway 1998; Lien and Hardaker 2001; 
Kumbhakar 2002; Kumbhakar and Tveteras 2003; Roosen and Hennessy 2003). Using panel 
data has several benefits for empirical analysis. For example, it enlarges the sample size, 
enhances the power of statistical tests, and facilitates analysis of dynamic properties of 
relationships. However, a daunting challenge arising from both time series and panel data 
regressions is the possibility that variables involved in the regressions are nonstationary. Unless a 
linear combination of nonstationary variables is stationary, i.e., the variables are cointegrated, 
use of ordinary regression estimators may lead to spurious results (Phillips 1986; Engle and 
Granger 1987). 
Traditional tests of unit roots and cointegration have low power against the alternate 
hypothesis of stationarity in small and moderate sized samples. Consequently, failure to reject 
the hypothesis of a unit root in the series or in the linear combination of variables may occur 
because of the low power of the tests as well as failure of the data to satisfy the necessary 
conditions. Whatever the cause, failure to find stationarity in each series or in a linear 
combination of the series gives the analyst pause when seeking to estimate long-run relationships 
in the data. Recent developments in time-series econometrics that combine time-series and 
cross-sectional information have provided important possibilities for surmounting this dilemma. 
Panel data increase the power of unit root and cointegration tests even though the length of the 
time series is unaffected. Consequently, confidence in time series test conclusions is increased by 
use of panel data.
Although pooled cross-sectional time-series data has been frequently used to examine 
firm behavior under risk, it appears that none has examined the time-series properties of the 5
panel data. Consequently, reported results are subject to the possibility of the spurious regression 
problem. The current research seeks to at least partially fill this void by employing recent 
advances in the econometrics literature designed to test for panel unit roots (i.e. Im, Pesaran, and 
Shin 1997) and panel cointegration (i.e. Pedroni 1999).
1  These panel tests allow for both 
parametric and dynamic heterogeneity across groups and are considerably more powerful than 
conventional methods (Harris and Tzavalis 1999). Besides its unique application to firm 
behavior under risk, this investigation joins only a small number of other studies in reporting 
empirical applications of panel cointegration techniques to a heterogeneous panel with multiple 
regressors.
2   
With this background, the objectives of this article are to: (a) extend the previous 
theoretical work by careful derivation of refutable and testable implications of the indirect utility 
function under both output price and quantity risk, (b) demonstrate that one previously 
maintained hypothesis is not a necessary condition for the derived implications, (c) empirically 
test the derived implications as well as a set of hypotheses about the nature of risk aversion 
practiced by producers using a traditional model in which stationarity of the data is implicitly 
assumed and time is included as a proxy for technical change, (d) examine the time-series 
properties of variables involved in a system of input demand equations by employing recent 
developments in panel unit root and panel cointegration techniques, (e) develop a model for 
input demands consistent with the time series test results and with technical change proxied by 
public research expenditures, and (f) contrast important inferences from hypothesis test results 
from this model with those from the traditional model.
The plan of this article is as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of the 
behavioral theory implied by curvature properties of the indirect utility function and derives a set 6
of testable hypotheses. The following section discusses our econometric model and introduces
the panel testing methodologies employed in this article. Time series properties of our data based 
on panel unit root and cointegration tests are then reported along with empirical results of the 
refutable hypotheses from both models. Conclusions are presented in the last section.
Theoretical Model
Traditionally, the introduction of price uncertainty into the theory of the competitive firm has 
been approached within an expected utility framework. The seminal works of Arrow (1965) and 
Pratt (1964) defined preferences of expected utility-maximizing decision makers over final 
wealth. Despite their unambiguous reference to final wealth, much of the analysis of risk taking 
behavior of agricultural producers, beginning with Sandmo (1971), has used profit rather than 
wealth as the argument of utility (Meyer and Meyer 1998). Profit is the appropriate argument 
only if sources of wealth other than profit are nonrandom and held fixed. Since we do not wish to 
impose nonrandom constraints on other sources of wealth, we use wealth as the argument of 
utility in the following theoretical model. Therefore, the firm is assumed to maximize its 
expected utility of random wealth. 
Following Feder (1977) and Saha and Shumway (1998), we assume that a competitive 
firm’s random wealth  W    can be structured as a nonrandom part Z(∙), a random component S(∙), 
and nonrandom initial (beginning of period) wealth endowment I:
(1)     ; , ; ; I W Z S          x x
where x=(x1, x2,…, xn)’ is an  1 n   vector of decision variables,     is a random variable vector, 
β is a parameter vector, and · denotes the additional parameters concealed in Z(∙) and S(∙). The 
parameters, β, only enter the nonrandom part of wealth, Z(∙), but not the random part S(∙). 7
Although we later demonstrate that it is unnecessary for our refutable implications to hold under 
output price and output quantity risk, we initially maintain the standard expectation:
(2)   E ; , 0 S         x
where E denotes the expectation operator.
Conditional on twice-differentiable functions of Z and S, the expectation of random 
wealth defined by (1) and (2) can be written as:   
(3)         E ; , I E ; ; ; , I W W Z S Z             
     x x x .
Refutable Implications of the Indirect Utility Function
For a competitive firm whose objective is to maximize the expected utility of random 
wealth specified by (1), the indirect utility function is defined by: 
(4)           ;I, E ; , ; ; I V max U Z S               x x , 
where U(∙) represents the von Neumann Morgenstern utility function, which is increasing in 
wealth, therefore is increasing in nonrandom part of wealth, Z(x; β, ∙). Let x*(β, I, ∙) denote the 
optimal input variables which are determined by (4). Under the assumptions of (1) and (2), the 
indirect utility function defined by (4) implies the following propositions (Saha and Shumway 
1998):
Proposition 1: The indirect utility function defined by (1) has the following first-order curvature 
properties:
(i) Increasing in I,
(ii) Increasing (decreasing) in β if Z is increasing (decreasing) in β.
Proposition 2: The second-order curvature properties of the indirect utility function indicate:
(i) V quasiconvex in β and I if Z is convex in β,   8
(ii) V quasiconvex in β and I   symmetric and positive semidefinite (SPSD),
where   
* *
I Z Z Z         x x x .
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Corollary: Under risk neutrality or CARA, xI*=0, and Z convex in β
* Z Z      xx   is SPSD. 
Obviously, V(β; I, ∙) is increasing in I. Proposition 1(ii) indicates that the first-order 
curvature properties of the indirect utility function corresponding to β can be revealed by the 
first-order curvature characters of the nonrandom part of wealth Z(x; β, ∙). Proposition 2(i) 
implies the fundamental second-order curvature properties of the indirect utility function which 
can be explored by observing the properties of the second-order curvature of Z(x; β, ∙). By 
proposition 2(i), V(β; I, ∙) is quasi-convex in β if Z is convex in β. This property implies and is 
implied by the testable postulates contained in proposition 2(ii). In proposition 2(ii), the 
symmetric and positive semi-definite (SPSD) matrix,  , which contains the comparative static 
and reciprocity results demonstrating the firm behaviors, includes the complete set of the 
refutable implications for the competitive firm under risk. Most importantly, propositions 1 and 2 
do not rely on specific forms of U(∙) that would otherwise impose an explicit risk preference 
(Love and Buccola 1991; Saha Shumway and Talpaz 1994). When combined with the 
empirically testable curvature properties of Z(x; β, ∙), they allow us to test the behavioral 
postulates without assuming a specific functional form for the indirect utility function.   
These refutable propositions derived by Saha and Shumway (1998) have been 
empirically tested only under output price uncertainty. One important theoretical contribution of 
this article, the importance of which will be explained in the next section, is to demonstrate that 
the propositions hold even without assumption (2). From the proof in Saha and Shumway (1998), 
it is obvious that proposition 1 and proposition 2(ii) aren’t conditioned on assumption (2), and all 
that is needed for them to hold is assumption (1). We refer readers to Saha and Shumway (1998) 9
for the details. Before proving that proposition 2(i) holds without assumption (2), we claim the 
following result. 
Claim. The firm’s optimization problem defined in (4) is equivalent to a constrained 
optimization problem where x and  W   are jointly chosen. Defining    ,W  k x   and  λ= {β, I}, 
then:
(5)
   
           
maxE ; , ; ; I
max E ; ; E ; ; | ; , E ; ; I
x
k
V U Z S
V U W S S W Z S
 
   
      
              
  
      
x x
x x x x
.
Proof: First, we demonstrate that the constraint,  ( ;β, ) E[ ( ; ; )] I W Z S        x x , will be 
binding for all optimal values of     and  W x . Suppose the constraint is not binding, then there 
must exist some parameter values 
0 0 0 0 0 0 { ,  } and  {β , I } W   k x λ   such that 
0 0 0 { ,  }  W  k x
and 
0 0 0 {β , I }  λ   maximize the indirect utility, given by (5), with the following condition 
(6)    
0 0 0 0 0 x ; , E ; ; I W Z S x             .
Therefore, there exists some 
0 ' W W    such that 
(7)
0 0 0 0 ' E ' ( ;β , ) I E ( ; ; ), W W Z S         x x
which implies 
0 { ,  '} W x   is feasible.
Since the utility function is increasing in wealth, we have
(8)
0 0 0 0 0 E ( ' ( ; ; ) E[ ( ; ; )]) E ( ( ; ; ) E[ ( ; ; )]) U W S S U W S S                  x x x x ,
which contradicts the fact that 
0 0 0 0 0 0 { ,  } and  {β , I } W   k x λ   maximize the indirect utility. 
Thus, the constraint is binding for all optimal values of   and  k λ, and the claim is proved by 
substituting the binding constraint  E ( ;β, ) I E ( ; ; ) W W Z S         x x   into (5).10
With claim 1 proven, we can now prove that proposition 2(i) is implied by assumption (1). 
Let        , ; , E ; ; I H k W Z S           x x , which is non-positive. Then (5) is equivalent to 
the following expression:
(9)             , max E ; ; E ; ; | , 0
k V U W S S            k k      x x .
If    ; , Z   x   is convex in ,  0 and  0 Z Z      . The Hessian matrix of    , H  k   with 
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                   
 
    
Let  ,      and     be any feasible vectors such that    1 , 0 1 t t t             and  k
denotes the optimal vector corresponding to   . Under the conditions  0 Z     and  | | 0 D  , D
is negative semi-definite, which implies    , H  k   is quasiconcave in    ,I    . Therefore, the 
following inequality holds: 
(11)         min , , , , 0, H H H        k k k
which is sufficient to ensure that either      , 0 or  , 0, H H      k k   or both. Therefore, 
(12)         , max , , , V V V          . 
By definition, the inequality in (12) implies that    V    is quasiconvex in  λ.
Testable Hypotheses
Consider a firm’s production function that has the following general form:
(13)   , Y f     Y x11
and random price denoted by:
(14) , P     P P
where   Y   is random output quantity; f(x), a function of input vectors x, is called the mean 
output function;   P   denotes random price;  P   is the mean of price; Y and P are stochastic 
terms which represent random production shock and random price shock respectively; 
  0 Y E     and    0 P E   . Letting r = {r1, …, rn}’ be the price vector of inputs, random wealth 
under output price and output quantity uncertainty will be:
(15)     I I. Y P P Y W f f              r r        P Y x P x P x x
In terms of the notation in the preceding section, r corresponds to β, the nonrandom part 
of wealth is:
(16)     ; , , Z f   r r    x P x x
and the random component of wealth is:
(17)     ; ; Y P P Y S f              x P x
Therefore,        E ; ; E Y P P Y P Y S f E                          x P x . Under the assumption of no 
correlation between output prices and quantities,    E 0 P Y       and thus    E ; ; 0 S         x , 
which is consistent with assumption (2). 
For an individual firm operating in a competitive market   E 0 P Y     because the 
firm’s decisions cannot affect the general equilibrium of the market. However, much empirical 
analysis, including ours, uses data for aggregates of firms.    Sometimes that is for convenience 
and other times it is necessary because essential firm-level data don’t exist. Even though the 
decisions of individual price-taking firms can’t affect the market equilibrium, the collective 12
decisions of many firms can. Thus, since we have demonstrated that assumption (2) is 
unnecessary for any of the previous implications to hold, it is clear that we can make use of 
aggregate data, if necessary, to conduct empirical tests of both propositions.
With random wealth under output price and output quantity uncertainty defined as in 
equations (15), (16) and (17), the indirect utility function becomes:
(18)           ;I, E ; , ; ; I . V max U Z S         r r     x x
By proposition 1(ii), the firm’s indirect utility function, V(r; I, ∙), is decreasing in r since the 
firm’s expected profit, i.e., a nonrandom portion of wealth, decreases in r. Applying the envelope 




V Z     r r x
where 
S
  denotes ‘same sign as’. The result in (19) is the first-order curvature property of the 
indirect utility function.    It indicates that, as input prices increase, the terminal wealth of the 
producer diminishes and leads to a decrease in the utility of final wealth. By again applying the 
envelope theorem, Zrr = -xr
























*. Using this result, the second-order curvature result of proposition 2(ii) translates 
to:
(21a)      V(r;  I, ∙) quasiconvex in r and I   
* * *
I 2      r x x x   is SPSD,
which implies the following matrix is symmetric negative semidefinite:
(21b)
* * *
I 2 .    r x x x13
Specifically, when there are three input variables, (21b) can be rewritten as:
(21c)
* * * * * * * * *
1 1 1I 1 1 2 1I 2 1 3 1I 3
* * * * * * * * *
2 1 2I 1 2 2 2I 2 2 3 2I 3
* * * * * * * * *
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     
     
     
x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
.
Equations (19) and (21a)-(21c) reveal that the propositions imply a set of testable hypotheses 
associated with the input responses of the firm operating under output price and output quantity 
uncertainty. Therefore, the propositions implied by the indirect utility function can be 
empirically tested by imposing parameter restrictions on a firm’s demand equations.
Econometric Model and Empirical Methodology
Data 
Because we lack essential data to conduct tests of these propositions for a broad cross-section of 
individual U.S. firms, the above methodology was applied to annual state-level data for the 
period, 1960-1999.
4  The major data source was the ERS annual agricultural output and input 
series for each of the contiguous 48 states for the period 1960-1999 (Ball 2002). This 
high-quality aggregate data set includes a comprehensive inventory of agricultural output and 
input prices and quantities compiled using theoretically and empirically sound procedures 
consistent with a gross output model of production (see Ball et al. 1999, for details). The data set 
includes three output groups (crops, livestock, and secondary outputs) and four input groups 
(materials, capital, labor, and land). 
Initial stock of wealth, I, was proxied by equity, or "net worth", which measures farm 
business assets minus farm business debt. These data for each state were taken from the Farm 
Balance Sheets (USDA/ERS). 
Deflated annual public research expenditures for each state for the period 1927-1995 
were from Huffman (2002). These data served as proxies for technical innovation in the model 14
based on the time series properties of the data. It has been showed that research expenditures can 
affect technology, or the nature of the production function, at least seven years later and
sometimes as long as 30 years later (Chavas and Cox 1992; Pardey and Craig 1989). Akaike’s 
Information Criterion (AIC) was used to select the optimal lag on public research expenditures. 
Lagged output prices were used as proxies for expected output prices. Lagged equity was 
used as a proxy for initial (beginning period) wealth. To partially mitigate the effects of trending 
and autocorrelated data, expected output prices, equity, and current input prices were normalized 
by the price of land. To reduce heteroskedasticity and to permit estimation of identical 
non-intercept coefficients for all states in the panel data set, input quantities, normalized equity, 
and deflated research expenditures were scaled by the quantity of land.
5
Econometric Model
Without maintaining any additional hypotheses about the input demand equations, we used a 
quadratic (second-order Taylor-series expansion) functional form to approximate the input 
demand framework. Input demand equations for materials/land, capital/land, and labor/land were 
each estimated as a fixed-effects panel data model: 
(22)
2
j j j j 1j 2j j 0.5 t 0.5 t ,j 1,2,3 e              d z z z x
where xj is the quantity of the j
th input measured as input per unit of land; d is the vector of state 
dummy variables; the vector z = {p1, p2, p3, r1, r2, r3, I} contains lagged output prices pi (for crops, 
livestock, and secondary outputs), current input prices rj (for materials, capital, and labor), and 
lagged farm equity per unit of land I, each normalized by the price of land; t is the proxy for 
technological innovations and is represented by time = 1, . . ., 40 in the traditional model and by 
public research expenditures per unit of land in the time-series-based model; the error term is 
denoted by ej: parameters to be estimated are the vectors j, j, j, and the scalars 1j, 2j. 15
For each individual equation in the demand system specified by (22), fixed effects across 
cross-sectional observations were considered. So that all refutable implications under output 
price and output quantity risk contained in (19) and (21a)-(21c) could be tested, no restrictions 
were imposed on the estimated parameters across the equations. 
Since stationarity of all variables is implicitly assumed when equation (22) is estimated 
without first examining their time-series properties, the results of the traditional model may be 
misleading. In the time-series-based model, we checked whether any of the variables contain unit 
roots, and if they do, whether a linear combination of the variables as represented in equation (22) 
also have a unit root (i.e., are not cointegrated). If they are cointegrated, a valid long-run 
relationship can be represented by equation (22). Variables are cointegrated if they are stationary 
after differencing and no unit root exists in the residuals (Engle and Granger, 1987). If all 
nonstationary variables in equation (22) are cointegrated, the equation represents a structural 
rather than a spurious relationship.   
Unit Root Tests in Panel Data
The most common procedure used to test for a unit root in a data series is the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The null hypothesis of this test is nonstationarity. Given the small 
span of our time series (40 annual observations), conventional ADF tests conducted on each
individual state series can have very low power and lead to seriously misguided conclusions. The 
preferred choice is to apply a panel unit root test. 
Several procedures have been proposed to test for the null hypothesis of nonstationarity 
in panels. Quah (1992, 1994) developed a test for a unit root in panel data subject to 
homogeneous dynamics. Levin and Lin (1993) generalized this method to allow for fixed effects, 
individual deterministic trends, and heterogeneous serially correlated errors. However, the 16
alternative hypothesis only allowed for the possibility of identical first-order autoregressive 
coefficients in all series. To allow for residual serial correlation and heterogeneous 
autoregressive coefficients across groups, Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1997) (hereafter IPS) proposed
using an average of the ADF tests. Monte Carlo experiments showed that the IPS test 
outperforms Levin and Lin's test, especially having greater power and better small-sample 
properties (Im, Pesaran, and Shin 1997). Consequently, the IPS test is the panel unit root test we 
employ. 
It consists of testing the null hypothesis H0:  0 i i      (where i indicates a
cross-sectional member) against the alternative hypothesis Ha:  0 i   for some or all i in the 
following equation:
(23) , 1 , 1 , 1,2, , , 1, , ,
i p
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where y is a data series; t is time period;  , 1 it it i t y y y     ;  and  represent the idiosyncratic 
fixed effect and deterministic trend parameters to be estimated;  and  are other parameters to 
be estimated; and  is the error term. The IPS statistic is defined as the average of the ADF 










where  iT t   is the individual t-statistic for the ADF test of a unit root for an individual member in 
the panel. The resulting IPS statistic is:
(25)















where  [ | 0] T i E t     and  [ | 0] T i Var t     are the common mean and variance of  iT t , obtained 
by Monte Carlo simulation and tabulated in Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1997).17
As noted by Pedroni (1997) and Kao, Chiang, and Chen (1999) regarding heterogeneous 
panels with multiple regressors, it is inappropriate to apply individual unit root tests to judge the 
stationarity of estimated residuals from linear combinations of nonstationary variables. 
Consequently we pool the time-series and cross-sectional data sets and use Pedroni’s (1999) 
panel cointegration tests to test for the existence of a long-run relationship between the 
normalized input quantity xj and the right hand-side variables in equations (22). 
Consider the following time series panel regression:
(26) ,   1,..., ,   1,..., , it i it i i it y X t e i N t T         
where it y and it X are the observable dependent and independent variables with dimensions
( ) 1 N T   and ( ) N T m   , respectively; m is the number of regressors;  are the regressor 
parameters to be estimated; it e is a vector of disturbance terms. Pedroni (1999) proposed 
several statistics that can be classified into two categories. One category consists of 
within-dimension-based statistics (or panel statistics), in the spirit of Levin and Lin (1993). 
These statistics pool the residuals along the “within dimension” of the panel, i.e., numerator and 
denominator components of the test statistics are summed separately over the cross-sectional 
dimension. The second category consists of between-dimension-based statistics (or group mean 
statistics). Based on IPS (1997), these statistics obtain the ratio of numerator to denominator for 
each cross-sectional member prior to aggregating over the N dimension. 
In both cases, the null hypothesis is the same, i.e., that the variables are not cointegrated 
for each cross-sectional member. The alternative hypothesis is different for the two test 
categories. The alternative for the first test category (panel statistics) is that the stationary 
autoregressive parameter is homogeneous. Maddala and Wu (1999) argue that this alternative is 
unreasonable, and that the second test category (group statistics) is more appropriate since the 18
alternative hypothesis, which permits heterogeneous autoregressive parameters, is less 
restrictive. 
Two statistics for the second category of tests are as follows:
(27) (Group ρ statistic)   
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Adjusted by appropriate constants obtained from the moments of the underlying 
Brownian motion functions, these statistics are distributed as standard normal when both N and T
grow large. Large left tail values of these statistics imply rejection of the null hypothesis in favor 
of cointegration.
Empirical Results
Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
As illustrated in figure 1, a structural change involving a break in volatility occurred in 
approximately 1981 for most of the states for all the normalized prices and normalized wealth. 
To mimic the effects of such a structural break, we split the data for normalized prices and 
wealth variables for all states into two groups at 1981. A linear regression of each variable on 19
year was estimated for each time period, and standard deviations were computed. After dividing 
the normalized prices and equity in each time period by the respective standard deviation, the 
transformed data were used in the panel tests.
As also illustrated in figure 1, all cross-sectional members in the panel had almost the 
same time pattern for prices and equity variables. The implication is that the price series and 
equity tended to be driven by some common external disturbance. As recommended by IPS, the 
common time effects across states was purged by regressing each normalized price series and 
normalized equity on a set of time dummies and using these residuals in the unit root tests. This 
approach assumes that the disturbances for each member of the panel can be decomposed into 
common disturbances that are shared among all members of the panel and independent 
idiosyncratic disturbances that are specific to each member.
The results of the unit root tests proposed by IPS are shown for each variable in table 1. 
These tests allowed each panel member to have a different autoregressive coefficient and short 
run dynamics under the alternative hypothesis of trend stationarity. The tests were conducted 
using the econometric software package RATS version 6, routine PANCOINT. Following the 
suggestion of Newey and West (1994), the number of lags included in each test was determined 
by the Bartlett kernel with the bandwidth parameter, ki , set equal to the integer of 4(T/100)
2/9, 
i.e., ki=3 in our application. The lag on research expenditures was determined by minimizing
AIC for lags of 7-30 years. The optimal lag ranged from 17 to 30 years, depending on input 
demand equation. For convenience in subsequent analysis, an identical lag of 17 years was 
selected for all equations. This value was the optimal lag for the labor equation, and the 
distribution of AIC values was much flatter for the other equations than for the labor equation. 20
The unit root test statistics were distributed as N(0,1) under the null of a unit root with a 
one-tailed negative test statistic for the alternative hypothesis. 
At the 5% significance level, a unit root was rejected only for the series x3, r3, and p2. 
When the other (nonstationary) variables were tested for a unit root in first differences, the 
alternative hypothesis was stationarity without a trend since any time trend in levels was
removed by differencing (Canning and Pedroni, 1999). The test statistic for 1
st differences was 
negative and significant at a 5% level in each variable except for x1. The latter was significant at 
a 10% level. Although higher than our prespecified significance level, we accepted x1 as a 
stationary series in first differences because it continued to exhibit nonstationarity at the 5% level 
even after 4
th differencing. Consequently, we conclude that x3, r3, and p2 are stationary, i.e., 
integrated of order zero – I(0), and that all other variables are integrated of order one, I(1).
  We next tested for cointegration among the nonstationary variables for each input
demand equation. If the data are cointegrated for an input demand, equation (22) for that input 
can be estimated using the original (i.e., untransformed) data to capture the long-run 
relationships in the data. If the data are not cointegrated, first differences must be taken for all 
variables except x3, r3 and p2 in order to capture the long-run relationships 
In order to improve the power of the cointegration tests, we considered the trade-off 
between size and power of the tests (Haug, 1996). By pooling the data across states, the group
mean statistics for panel cointegration tests in Pedroni (1999) could be applied. Some variables 
(i.e., all the normalized prices and equity) involved in the input demand equations (equation 22) 
tended to be cross-sectionally dependent, and the others did not. Therefore, in the panel 
cointegration testing procedure, we considered both the case including common time dummies 21
(to capture effects that tend to cause individual state variables to move together over time) and 
the case without time dummies.
As suggested by Pedroni (1999), the adjustment terms for the panel cointegration tests 
were obtained by Monte Carlo simulation on the basis of 10,000 draws of 37 independent 
random walks (i.e., the number of regressors exclusive of dummy variables) of length 
T=10,000.
6  The results of the panel cointegration tests, presented in table 2, show that there is 
no evidence of cointegration among the variables for any of the demand equations. Consequently, 
the time-series-based input demand equations were estimated using differenced data for all 
variables except x3, r3, and p2.
Econometric Model Estimates
For the purpose of comparison, two sets of input demand equations were estimated.    They 
included (a) the traditional model in which all variables were implicitly assumed to be stationary 
and (b) the time-series-based model that accounted for non-rejected time series properties of the 
data investigated in last sub-section. In both models, each equation had the same regressors and 
no across-equation restrictions were imposed. Consequently, the SUR parameter estimates were 
identical to OLS estimates. The SUR estimation procedure was used to permit across-equation 
tests to be conducted, as required for proposition 2.
Before estimating the traditional model, we first tested for a 1st-order autoregressive 
(AR(1)) process in the error terms for each input demand equation defined in (22). Evidence of 
an AR(1) process was found in each equation with Durbin-Watson test statistics of 0.311, 0.317, 
and 0.674, respectively, for the materials, capital, and labor input demand equations. Subject to 
the assumption that the autoregressive coefficients (rho) within a demand equation were identical 
across states, estimates of rho for the three input demand equations were 0.971, 0.923, and 0.870, 22
respectively. The data were transformed for 1st-order autocorrelation and used in a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) estimation of the system of three input demand equations.
7  The 
traditional model estimates of the input demand equations are reported in table 3. The R
2 values 
for the three equations in (22) were 0.834, 0.542, and 0.791 respectively.
Parameter estimates for the time-series-based input demand equations are reported in 
table 4.
8  The R
2 values were considerably lower (0.153 and 0.204) for the materials and capital 
equations estimated by this model than by the traditional model. However, it should be recalled 
that the data used for the dependent variables were not the same. They were untransformed data 
in the traditional model and first differences in the time-series-based model. For the labor 
equation, the data used for the dependent variable was the same in both models and the R
2 value 
was higher (0.935) in the time-series-based model.
It is well known that failing to properly account for unit roots in time-series data often 
results in spurious conclusions being drawn about significant relationships. Our findings were 
consistent with that expectation.    Far fewer estimated parameters were significant in our 
time-series-based model than in our traditional model. For example, 20, 46, and 51% of 
estimated parameters in the materials, capital, and labor demand equations, respectively, were 
significant at the 5% level of significance in the time-series-based model. These compared to 76, 
58, and 73%, respectively, in the traditional model. Excluding dummy variables, the traditional 
model overestimated the number of significant relationships by 60-100%. In addition, of 35
common non-dummy coefficients in these two models, many changed signs – 11 in the materials
demand equation, 20 in the capital demand equation, and 20 in the labor demand equation.   23
Hypothesis Test Results
Hypothesis tests of the propositions and corollary were conducted on the estimated parameters at 
the data means. These results, as well as a tabulation of predicted values consistent with the 
hypotheses at each observation, are presented in table 5 for both models. Proposition 1 was 
examined by testing whether each of the three predicted input demands in equation (22) was 
positive. These test results are listed as propositions 1.1-1.3 in table 5. The null hypothesis of a 
zero input demand level was rejected by both models in favor of positive predicted input 
demands at the data means for each input at a 5% significance level. In addition, nearly all the 
predicted input quantities were strictly positive at individual observations. For the traditional 
model, among 1,872 observations, only 11 predicted capital quantities and one predicted labor 
quantity violated first-order curvature properties. For the time-series-based model, a higher 
rejection rate were found – among 1,824 observations, 78 predicted capital quantities and 14
predicted labor quantities violated first-order curvature properties.
The second proposition that 
* * *
I ( 2 )     r х х х   is symmetric positive semidefinite was 
tested by the equivalent specification that 
* * *
I 2    r х х х   is symmetric negative semidefinite. 
To test this proposition, three individual tests (tests 2.1-2.3 in table 5) were conducted for 
negative semidefiniteness and a joint test (test 3 in table 5) for symmetry. The tests for negative 
semidefiniteness involved tests that all the leading principal minors of     alternative in signs, 
starting with a nonpositive first leading principal minor, i.e., the first diagonal element. None of 
the refutable behavioral hypotheses implied by second-order curvature properties of the indirect 
utility function was rejected at the data means by either model. In the traditional model, although 
both the second leading principal minor (test 2.2) and the determinant (test 2.3) of    had 
unexpected signs at the data means, they were not significantly different from zero. Considerably 24
more evidence of second-order curvature violations than of first-order curvature violations at 
individual observations than of first-order condition violations. Except for test 2.3 with the 
time-series-based model, individual violations didn’t exceed 25% of the observations.
The test results for symmetry of     are presented in test 3 in table 5. The three 
symmetric restrictions were rejected at the 5% significance level by the joint test conducted at 
data means in both models. Thus, the hypothesis implied by proposition 2 that  is symmetric 
positive semidefinite is statistically rejected at this data point. Whether rejection of symmetry 
constitutes a rejection of the hypothesis that the collection of firms in each state act as though 
they were a single expected utility-maximizing firm, or whether it simply implies that the 
indirect utility function is not twice continuously differentiable at the data means is ambiguous 
from these test results. Unfortunately, we are unable to resolve the ambiguity in this article.
Decision making consistent with constant absolute risk aversion or risk neutrality implies 
three restrictions on input demand responses. The result (test 4 in table 5) indicates that these 
restrictions were rejected by the joint test at the data means at the 5% significance level in both 
models. 
Our results using state-level aggregates were similar in a number of respects to Saha and 
Shumway’s (1998) findings about output price risk for Kansans wheat farmers. However, we 
found less support in the aggregate data than they found in the firm-level data for symmetry of 
the indirect utility function. Our conclusions about first-order curvature properties and the nature 
of producers’ risk preference were the same as theirs. The extant literature has not reached a 
consensus regarding the nature of farmers’ risk preferences (Goodwin and Mishra, 2002), but a 
few have found empirical support for the hypothesis of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).   25
Among those are the work of Park and Antonovitz (1992a, 1992b) who failed to reject CARA 
for California feedlots.
Conclusions
This study has extended the Saha and Shumway (1998) model of a competitive firm operating 
under output price risk to a firm operating under both output price and output quantity risk. One 
important theoretical contribution to the previous literature is that the refutable propositions 
implied by the indirect utility function are shown to hold without one of the previously 
maintained hypotheses. Therefore, the only conditions required for the propositions to hold are: 
(a) random wealth can be structured as three parts – a nonrandom part of profit, a random part of 
profit, and nonrandom initial wealth, and (b) there exists an optimal input vector that maximizes 
the expected utility function. Both are common assumptions in the firm theory under uncertainty. 
Without requiring the previously imposed assumption that the expectation of the random part of 
profit is zero, the propositions can be empirically applied to varied market structures by 
permitting tests when there is a nonzero correlation between the error terms of random output 
price and random output quantity. 
Moreover, a set of testable hypotheses associated with input responses under multiple 
sources of risk were derived from these propositions, and empirically tested for aggregates of 
firms operating under both output price and output quantity risk. This is the first study using an 
aggregate state-level panel data set to empirically test for utility-maximizing behavior by 
considering each aggregate as though it were an expected utility-maximizing firm. Aggregate 
agricultural production data for these states have previously been found to approximate 
nonparametric conditions for consistent behavior with this hypothesis.26
To avoid the possibility of spurious estimation from statistical estimation using 
nonstationary data, we examined the time series properties of the data. The data were tested both 
for nonstationarity and cointegration using recent developments in time-series econometrics, i.e., 
Im, Pesaran, and Shin’s panel unit root tests and Pedroni’s panel cointegration tests. Most of the 
data series were found to be nonstationary but none of the demand equations exhibited evidence 
of cointegration among nonstationary variables. Two models were developed and used for 
comparison purposes to test the expected utility maximization hypotheses – a traditional model 
that implicitly assumed stationary data and a model based on nonrejected time series properties 
of the data.
In both models, parametric results showed that the behavioral postulates implied by the 
first-order curvature properties of the indirect utility function could not be rejected at the data 
means, and the data at nearly all individual observations were consistent with these properties. 
The second-order curvature properties were also not rejected at the data means, but a larger 
portion of the observations were inconsistent with the hypotheses. The symmetry property 
implied by a twice continuously differentiable indirect utility function was soundly rejected at 
the data means by both models. The empirical evidence from both models also failed to support 
ad hoc risk preference assumptions of either risk neutrality or constant absolute risk aversion.27
Footnotes
1 See Banerjee (1999), Baltagi and Kao (1999), and Phillips and Moon (1999) for surveys of the recent theoretical 
literature on panel unit root tests and panel cointegration tests. 
2  Exceptions are Bandiera et al. (2000), McCoskey and Kao (1999), and Sarantis and Stewart (2001). 
3  The following notation is used throughout this article: hx denotes the partial derivative of h(∙) with respect to x, hxy
represents the Hessian matrix whose ij
th element is
2 /
i j h x y    , where h(∙) is a real-value function of vectors x and y.
4  The theory of the expected utility maximization applies to the individual, in this case the individual firm. Although 
tests of utility maximization have not been reported for state-level data, Lim and Shumway (1992) failed to reject 
the hypothesis that each of the states acted as though they were profit-maximizing firms. They used nonparametric 
testing procedures on annual data for the period 1956-1982, which overlaps with the first 23 years of our data 
period. 
5  Significant (5% level) groupwise heteroskadasticity was still found in the scaled data.   
6  Pedroni (1999) tabulated the adjustment terms for a maximum of seven regressors. 
7  Although evidence was found that significant heteroskedasticity still remained across states, we were unable to 
transform the data to remove cross-sectional heteroskedasticity because we had more cross-sectional units than time 
periods. 
8  An additional dummy variable was included in each input demand equation in the time-series-based model for the 
production year 1983 to pick up the effects of the PIK program.References
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Panel Unit Root Test for First Differences with Trend:
x1 0.803 Nonstationary
x2 0.043 Nonstationary










Panel Unit Root Test for First Differences without Trend:
x1 -1.371* Stationary
x2 -5.799*** Stationary
r1 -6.622 *** Stationary
r2 -6.7845*** Stationary
p1 -8.107 *** Stationary
p3 -7.755 *** Stationary
w0 -8.608 *** Stationary
res -8.922 *** Stationary
a x1, x2, x3, and res were tested without time dummies, and other variables were tested with time 
dummies.
b Based on Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1997):
* Reject the null of a unit root (nonstationarity) at the 10% level (lower-tail critical value = 
-1.282)
** Reject the null of a unit root at the 5% level (lower-tail critical value = -1.645)
*** Reject the null of a unit root at the 1% level (lower-tail critical value = -2.326)
c The variable res is public research expenditures. Other variables are defined in the text.33
Table 2. Panel Cointegration Test Results 
Demand Equation
Test Statistic
Test With or Without Time 
Dummies
x1 x2 x3
With 4.578 4.075 4.751
Group ρ-Statistic
Without 4.189 4.456 4.393
With -1.264 -5.621 -0.297
Group t-Statistic
Without 2.343 1.643 -1.32134



















d1 0.218*** 0.032 0.132*** 0.014 0.359*** 0.072
d2 0.091*** 0.032 0.087*** 0.014 0.239*** 0.074
d3 0.035  0.031 0.028** 0.014 0.134* 0.072
d4 0.239*** 0.030 0.132*** 0.013 0.730*** 0.067
d5 0.047  0.031 0.061*** 0.014 0.162** 0.074
d6 0.170*** 0.031 0.284*** 0.014 1.068*** 0.069
d7 0.739*** 0.030 0.301*** 0.013 0.722*** 0.067
d8 0.112*** 0.031 0.075*** 0.014 0.413*** 0.068
d9 0.235*** 0.031 0.156*** 0.014 0.435*** 0.069
d10 0.114*** 0.031 0.171*** 0.014 0.362*** 0.069
d11 0.070** 0.031 0.089*** 0.014 0.266*** 0.072
d12 0.092*** 0.031 0.180*** 0.014 0.310*** 0.068
d13 0.138*** 0.031 0.230*** 0.014 0.454*** 0.068
d14 0.075** 0.031 0.093*** 0.014 0.230*** 0.071
d15 0.091*** 0.031 0.157*** 0.014 0.435*** 0.069
d16 0.086*** 0.031 0.102*** 0.014 0.278*** 0.069
d17 0.125*** 0.031 0.259*** 0.014 1.070*** 0.069
d18 0.309*** 0.031 0.288*** 0.013 0.755*** 0.067
d19 0.146*** 0.034 0.252*** 0.015 0.730*** 0.077
d20 0.200*** 0.031 0.307*** 0.014 0.786*** 0.069
d21 0.178*** 0.031 0.227*** 0.014 0.567*** 0.069
d22 0.115*** 0.031 0.165*** 0.014 0.465*** 0.069
d23 0.131*** 0.031 0.099*** 0.014 0.273*** 0.071
d24 -0.026  0.033 0.043*** 0.015 0.159** 0.079
d25 0.191*** 0.031 0.158*** 0.014 0.516*** 0.069
d26 0.018  0.033 0.076*** 0.015 0.198*** 0.077
d27 0.127*** 0.031 0.107*** 0.014 0.295*** 0.070
d28 0.086*** 0.031 0.202*** 0.014 0.716*** 0.070
d29 0.156*** 0.031 0.529*** 0.014 1.234*** 0.067
d30 -0.011  0.033 0.039*** 0.015 0.158** 0.079
d31 -0.041  0.037 0.033** 0.017 0.092 0.086
d32 0.184*** 0.031 0.283*** 0.014 0.757*** 0.070




















d34 0.041  0.031 0.068*** 0.014 0.237*** 0.071
d35 0.125*** 0.031 0.100*** 0.014 0.369*** 0.070
d36 0.221*** 0.031 0.305*** 0.014 1.000*** 0.069
d37 0.097*** 0.031 0.302*** 0.014 1.012*** 0.070
d38 0.158*** 0.031 0.177*** 0.014 0.518*** 0.069
d39 0.033  0.031 0.079*** 0.014 0.198*** 0.074
d40 0.065** 0.031 0.122*** 0.014 0.361*** 0.071
d41 0.022  0.031 0.054*** 0.014 0.165** 0.072
d42 0.015  0.032 0.056*** 0.014 0.171** 0.075
d43 0.008  0.031 0.128*** 0.014 0.347*** 0.070
d44 0.110*** 0.033 0.155*** 0.015 0.493*** 0.074
d45 0.121*** 0.031 0.139*** 0.014 0.469*** 0.069
d46 0.249*** 0.031 0.347*** 0.014 0.993*** 0.070
d47 0.0714** 0.031 0.135*** 0.014 0.435*** 0.071
d48 0.003  0.031 0.047*** 0.014 0.157** 0.075
p1 -0.048*** 0.010 -0.006 0.004 0.032 0.024
p2 0.0602*** 0.012 0.017*** 0.006 -0.064** 0.031
p3 -0.034** 0.021 -0.019** 0.011 0.023 0.062
r1 0.118*** 0.044 0.002 0.022 0.321*** 0.119
r2 -0.046** 0.019 0.003 0.009 0.038 0.051
r3 0.0002 0.023 -0.044*** 0.012 -0.379*** 0.072
I 0.003*** 0.001 0.0003 0.000 0.002 0.002
p1
2 0.015 ** 0.007 -0.008** 0.003 -0.017 0.018
p1 p2 -0.005 0.011 0.014*** 0.006 0.076** 0.029
p1 p3 -0.017 0.020 0.008 0.009 0.001 0.046
p1r1 0.033  0.039 0.004 0.016 -0.043 0.075
p1r2 -0.027  0.016 0.0002 0.007 -0.023 0.034
p1r3 0.021  0.025 -0.016 0.011 0.059 0.055
p1I -0.001  0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.016*** 0.003
p2
2 0.017  0.020 -0.022** 0.009 -0.197*** 0.044
p2 p3 -0.008  0.023 0.017 0.010 0.182*** 0.048
p2r1 -0.120**  0.048 -0.069*** 0.020 -0.162** 0.094




















p2r3 0.02806 0.038 0.019 0.017 -0.060 0.086
p2I 0.0003  0.002 0.001* 0.001 0.009** 0.003
p3
2 0.077  0.047 0.002 0.019 -0.122 0.087
p3r1 0.096  0.094 0.058 0.037 0.074 0.168
p3r2 -0.045  0.039 -0.016 0.017 -0.146* 0.080
p3r3 -0.014  0.058 0.002 0.027 0.239* 0.131
p3I 0.0003  0.004 -0.006*** 0.002 -0.016** 0.007
r1
2 -0.337** 0.187 -0.192*** 0.067 -0.515* 0.298
r1 r2 0.059  0.053 0.023 0.021 0.079 0.103
r1 r3 0.206* 0.115 0.138*** 0.044 0.230 0.201
r1I 0.008  0.006 0.015*** 0.002 0.048** 0.009
r2
2 -0.004 0.032 0.002** 0.014 0.053 0.065
r2r3 -0.040  0.041 -0.041** 0.017 -0.180** 0.080
r2I 0.008***  0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005
r3
2 -0.052  0.067 0.004 0.029 0.185 0.139
r3I -0.010** 0.005 -0.001 0.002 -0.029*** 0.008
I
2 0.0001  0.000 0.001*** 0.0001 0.003*** 0.0003
t -0.004** 0.002 0.003*** 0.001 -0.010*** 0.004
t
2 0.0003*** 0.00008 0.0002*** 0.00003 0.0003** 0.0002
R-Square 0.834 0.542 0.791
a Variable codes: p1 is crop price, p2 is livestock price, p3 is secondary output price, r1 is materials input price, 
r2 is capital input price, r3 is labor input price, I is farm equity, t is the time variable, d1-d48 are state dummy 
variables.
b Parameter estimates marked with *** are significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% 
level.
c SE is standard error. 37



















d35 0.051* 0.029 -0.051*** 0.012 1.432*** 0.098
d36 0.064** 0.027 -0.021* 0.011 5.949*** 0.092
d37 -0.009 0.029 -0.027** 0.012 6.706*** 0.099
d38 0.069** 0.027 -0.018* 0.011 3.110*** 0.091
d39 -0.002 0.030 -0.074*** 0.012 0.250** 0.101
d40 0.016 0.029 -0.043*** 0.012 1.394*** 0.099
d41 0.005* 0.029 -0.061*** 0.011 -0.014 0.098
d42 0.002 0.030 -0.059*** 0.012 0.228** 0.100
d43 0.002 0.028 -0.038*** 0.011 1.614*** 0.095
d44 0.049* 0.029 -0.034*** 0.011 2.355*** 0.097
d45 0.054** 0.027 -0.030*** 0.011 2.141*** 0.092
d46 0.055** 0.027 -0.036*** 0.011 6.669*** 0.091
d47 0.027 0.029 -0.050*** 0.011 2.243*** 0.097
d48 -0.009 0.029 -0.069*** 0.012 -0.210** 0.099
d83 0.117*** 0.039 0.022 0.016 0.294** 0.133
p1 -0.052** 0.024 0.018* 0.010 0.069 0.083
p2 -0.010 0.007 0.020*** 0.003 0.428*** 0.024
p3 0.047** 0.027 -0.015 0.011 -0.174* 0.092
r1 0.080** 0.036 -0.032** 0.014 -0.007 0.122
r2 -0.093*** 0.028 -0.006 0.011 -0.067 0.094
r3 0.038** 0.017 0.007 0.007 -0.420*** 0.059
I 0.002 0.012 -0.030*** 0.005 -0.029 0.040
p1
2 0.148* 0.042 0.020 0.017 -0.123 0.142
p1 p2 0.009 0.009 0.007* 0.004 0.023 0.032
p1 p3 -0.043 0.040 -0.0010 0.016 0.075 0.134
p1r1 -0.083* 0.049 0.009 0.020 0.007 0.168
p1r2 0.100** 0.039 -0.003 0.015 -0.007 0.132
p1r3 -0.014 0.030 -0.027** 0.012 -0.035 0.102
p1I -0.024 0.023 0.0006 0.009 -0.013 0.076
p2
2 0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.0009 -0.041*** 0.008
p2 p3 -0.017 0.012 0.001 0.005 0.061 0.041
p2r1 -0.036** 0.018 0.005 0.007 0.087 0.062




















p2r3 -0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.002 -0.048*** 0.018
d1 0.100*** 0.028 -0.031*** 0.011 1.477*** 0.095
d2 0.053* 0.029 -0.044*** 0.011 0.550*** 0.098
d3 0.005 0.030 -0.057*** 0.012 -0.049 0.100
d4 0.100*** 0.026 -0.011 0.010 3.568*** 0.088
d5 0.005 0.029 -0.068*** 0.012 -0.030 0.100
d6 0.038 0.027 -0.028** 0.011 6.052*** 0.093
d7 0.344*** 0.026 -0.009 0.011 4.036*** 0.090
d8 0.043 0.027 -0.018* 0.011 1.818*** 0.090
d9 0.113*** 0.027 -0.019* 0.011 2.225*** 0.092
d10 0.007 0.028 -0.032*** 0.011 1.811*** 0.094
d11 0.026 0.029 -0.055*** 0.012 0.706*** 0.099
d12 0.002 0.027 -0.026** 0.011 1.560*** 0.091
d13 0.026 0.027 -0.023** 0.011 2.625*** 0.091
d14 0.010 0.029 -0.059*** 0.011 0.564*** 0.098
d15 0.035 0.028 -0.021* 0.011 2.350*** 0.093
d16 0.027 0.028 -0.024** 0.011 1.467*** 0.094
d17 0.017 0.027 -0.030*** 0.011 6.616*** 0.093
d18 0.125*** 0.026 -0.008 0.011 4.286*** 0.090
d19 0.033 0.029 -0.033*** 0.012 4.226*** 0.099
d20 0.048* 0.027 -0.031*** 0.011 4.828*** 0.092
d21 0.041 0.027 -0.032*** 0.011 3.343*** 0.093
d22 0.024 0.027 -0.025** 0.011 2.613*** 0.092
d23 0.073** 0.029 -0.038*** 0.011 1.202*** 0.097
d24 -0.023 0.031 -0.073*** 0.012 -0.212** 0.105
d25 0.100*** 0.027 -0.024** 0.011 2.912*** 0.093
d26 -0.012 0.031 -0.072*** 0.012 0.109 0.105
d27 0.031 0.029 -0.048*** 0.011 1.121*** 0.097
d28 0.014 0.027 -0.033*** 0.011 3.863*** 0.093
d29 -0.006 0.026 0.026** 0.010 7.193*** 0.089
d30 -0.027 0.031 -0.074*** 0.012 -0.252** 0.104
d31 -0.006 0.033 -0.063*** 0.013 -0.205* 0.112




















d33 0.023 0.027 -0.026** 0.011 3.910*** 0.092
d34 0.011 0.029 -0.061*** 0.011 0.551*** 0.097
p2I 0.014* 0.008 -0.003 0.003 -0.054** 0.026
p3
2 0.012 0.049 -0.028 0.019 0.126 0.165
p3r1 0.026 0.062 -0.004 0.025 -0.055 0.210
p3r2 -0.038 0.044 0.009 0.017 0.056 0.149
p3r3 0.028 0.038 -0.005 0.015 -0.089 0.128
p3I 0.019 0.022 -0.001 0.009 -0.133* 0.075
r1
2 -0.099 0.041 0.043 0.016 -0.285 0.137
r1 r2 0.015 0.037 -0.011 0.015 0.116 0.126
r1 r3 0.078 0.057 0.006 0.023 -0.166 0.193
r1I -0.007 0.041 0.004 0.016 -0.015 0.140
r2
2 -0.029 0.035 0.013 0.014 -0.159 0.120
r2r3 -0.063 0.042 -0.007 0.017 0.138 0.143
r2I -0.012 0.027 -0.007 0.011 -0.088 0.092
r3
2 -0.004 0.012 0.007 0.005 0.320*** 0.042
r3I -0.035 0.022 0.023*** 0.009 0.111 0.075
I
2 -0.029 0.011 -0.023*** 0.004 0.168** 0.036
res -0.003** 0.001 -0.001** 0.0005 -0.032*** 0.004
res
2 0.00003 0.0001 -0.0001*** 0.00003 -0.002*** 0.0002
R-square 0.153 0.204 0.935
a materials input price, r2 is capital input price, r3 is labor input price, I is farm equity, t is the time variable, 
d1-d48 are state dummy variables, and d83 is the 1983 dummy variable.
b Parameter estimates marked with *** are significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% 
level.
c SE is standard error. 40
Table 5. Expected Utility Maximization Hypothesis Test Results
Traditional Model Time Series Model












1. V is decreasing in r
1.1 V is decreasing in 
r1,  1 ˆ 0 x 
1 ˆ 0 x  AN 98.706 0.000 0 8.486 0.000 0
1.2 V is decreasing in 
r2,  2 ˆ 0 x 
2 ˆ 0 x  AN 9.963 0.000 11 3.253 0.001 78
1.3 V is decreasing in 
r3,  3 ˆ 0 x 
3 ˆ 0 x  AN 56.521 0.000 1     228.681 0.000 14
2. 
* * *
I 2    r х х х   is negative semidefinite
2.1 1




1r 1I 1 2 0 x x x   
= zero AN -2.284 0.022 387 -4.739 0.000 1
2.2 2
nd leading           
principal minor of 
0  
= zero AN -1.736 0.083 460          3.258 0.001         232
2.3 Determinant of 
0  
= zero AN 0.772 0.440 450 -2.173 0.030 840
3. Symmetry of  
b W 71.770 0.000 -- 14.471 0.002 --








3I=0 = zero W 99.116 0.000 -- 9.755 0.021 --
a AN is asymptotic normal test, and W is Wald chi-squared test.
b Test of symmetry involves jointly testing H0: 
2 1
* * * * * *
1 1I 2 2 2I 1 2 2 , x x x x x x    r r    
3 1
* * * * * *
1 1I 3 3 3I 1 2 2 x x x x x x    r r       and 
3 2
* * * * * *
2 2I 3 3 3I 2 2 2 . x x x x x x    r r    
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